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We introduce a set of transformations on the set of all probability distributions over a ﬁnite
state space, and show that these transformations are the only ones that preserve certain ele-
mentary probabilistic relationships. This result provides a new perspective on a variety of
probabilistic inference problems in which invariance considerations play a role. Two particular
applications we consider in this paper are the development of an equivariance-based approach
to the problem of measure selection, and a new justiﬁcation for Haldanes prior as the distri-
bution that encodes prior ignorance about the parameter of a multinomial distribution.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Many rationality principles for probabilistic and statistical inference are based on
considerations of indiﬀerence and symmetry. An early expression of such a principle
is Laplaces principle of insuﬃcient reason: ‘‘One regards two events as equally prob-
able when one can see no reason that would make one more probable than the other,
because, even though there is an unequal possibility between them, we know not which
way, and this uncertainty makes us look on each as if it were as probable as the other’’0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2004.05.004
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lead to straightforward rules for probability assessments when the task is to assign
probabilities to a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent alternatives, none of which is distin-
guished from the others by any information we have. In this case all alternatives will
have to be assigned equal probabilities. Such a formalization of indiﬀerence by equi-
probability becomes notoriously problematic when from state spaces of ﬁnitely
many alternatives we turn to inﬁnite state spaces: on countably inﬁnite sets no
(countably additive) uniform probability distributions exist, and on uncountably
inﬁnite sets the concept of uniformity becomes ambiguous (as evidenced by the fa-
mous Bertrands paradox [10,26]).
On (uncountably) inﬁnite state spaces concepts of uniformity or indiﬀerence have
to be formalized on the basis of certain transformations of the state space: two sets of
states are to be considered equiprobable, if one can be transformed into the other
using some natural transformation t. This, of course, raises the sticky question what
transformations are to be considered as natural and probability-preserving. How-
ever, for a given state space, and a given class of probabilistic inference tasks, it often
is possible to identify natural transformation, so that the solution to the inference
tasks (which, in particular, can be probability assessments) should be invariant under
the transformations. The widely accepted resolution of Bertrands paradox, for
example, is based on such considerations of invariance under certain transforma-
tions. Also the uniform distribution on the real numbers is ultimately characterized
(up to a constant factor) through its invariance under rigid motions.
In this paper we are concerned with probabilistic inference problems that pertain
to probability distributions on ﬁnite state spaces. As indicated above, when dealing
with ﬁnite state spaces there does not seem to be any problem of capturing indiﬀer-
ence principles with equiprobability. However, even though the underlying space of
alternatives may be ﬁnite, the object of our study very often is the inﬁnite set of prob-
ability distributions on that space, i.e. for the state space S = {s1, . . . , sn} the (n  1)-
dimensional probability polytope
Dn :¼ ðp1; . . . ; pnÞ 2 Rn jpi 2 ½0; 1;
X
i
pi ¼ 1
( )
:
The objective of this paper now can be formulated as follows: we investigate what
natural transformations there exist of Dn, such that inference problems that pertain
to Dn should be solved in a way that is invariant under these transformations. In Sec-
tion 2 we identify a unique class of transformations that can be regarded as most nat-
ural in that they alone preserve certain relevant relationships between points of Dn.
In Sections 3 and 4 we apply this result to the problems of noninformative priors and
measure selection, respectively.2. Representation theorem
The nature of the result we present in this section can best be explained by an
analogy: suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the set of probability distribu-
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rather than the polytope Dn. Suppose, too, that all inputs and outputs for a given
type of inference problem consist of objects (e.g. points, convex subsets, etc.) in
Rn. In most cases, one would then probably require of a rational solution to the
inference problem that it does not depend on the choice of the coordinate system.
Speciﬁcally, if all inputs are transformed by a translation, i.e. by adding some con-
stant oﬀset r 2 Rn, then the outputs computed for the transformed inputs should be
just the outputs computed for the original inputs, also translated by r:
solði þ rÞ ¼ solðiÞ þ r; ð1Þ
where i stands for the inputs and sol for the solution of an inference problem. Condi-
tion (1) expresses an equivariance principle: when the problem is transformed in a cer-
tain way, then so should be its solution (not to be confused with invariance principles
according to which certain things should be unaﬀected by a transformation).
The question we now address is the following: what simple, canonical transforma-
tions of the set Dn exist, so that for inference problems whose inputs and outputs are
objects in Dn one would require an equivariance property analogous to (1)? Intui-
tively, we are looking for transformations of Dn that can be seen as merely a change
of coordinate system, and that leave all relevant geometric structures intact. The fol-
lowing deﬁnition collects some key concepts we will use.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A transformation of a set S is any bijective mapping t of S onto itself.
We often write ts rather than t(s). For a probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pn) 2 Dn
the set {i 2 {1, . . . , n}jpi > 0} is called the set of support of p, denoted support (p). A
transformation t of Dn is said to
• preserve cardinalities of support if for all p: jsupport(p)j = jsupport(tp)j;
• preserve sets of support if for all p: support(p) = support(tp).
A distribution p is called a mixture of p 0 and p00 if there exists k 2 [0, 1] such that
p = kp 0 + (1  k)p00 (in other words, p is a convex combination of p 0 and p00). A trans-
formation t is said to
• preserve mixtures if for all p, p 0, p00: if p is a mixture of p 0 and p00, then tp is a mix-
ture of tp 0 and tp00.The set of support of a distribution p 2 Dn can be seen as its most fundamental
feature: it identiﬁes the subset of states that are to be considered as possible at all,
and thus identiﬁes the relevant state space (as opposed to the formal state space
S, which may contain states si that are eﬀectively ruled out by p with pi = 0). When
the association of the components of a distribution p with the elements of the state
space S = {s1, . . . , sn} is ﬁxed, then p and p
0 with diﬀerent sets of support represent
completely incompatible probabilistic models that would not be transformed into
one another by a natural transformation. In this case, therefore, one would require
a transformation to preserve sets of support.
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where p is a permutation of {1, . . . , n}. Permutations preserve cardinalities of sup-
port, but not sets of support. Permutations of Dn are transformations that are re-
quired to preserve the semantics of the elements of Dn after a reordering of the
state space S: if S is reordered according to a permutation p, then p and pp are
the same probability distribution on S.
That a distribution p is a mixture of p 0 and p00 is an elementary probabilistic
relation between the three distributions. It expresses the fact that the probabilistic
model p can arise as an approximation to a ﬁner model that would distinguish the
two distinct distributions p 0 and p00 on S, each of which is appropriate in a separate
context. For instance, p 0 and p00 might be the distributions on S = {jam, heavy
traﬃc, light traﬃc} that represent the travel conditions on weekdays and week-
ends, respectively. A mixture of the two then will represent the probabilities of
travel conditions when no distinction is made between the diﬀerent days of the
week.
That a transformation preserves mixtures, thus, is a natural requirement that it
does not destroy elementary probabilistic relationships. Note that we do not require
that t preserves the mixture coeﬃcient: when p = kp 0 + (1  k)p00 then usually we will
have tp = jtp 0 + (1  j)tp00 with j5 k. In fact, it is easy to see that only the identity
function preserves both sets of supports and mixtures, such that the mixture coeﬃ-
cient is unchanged.
We now introduce the class of transformations that we will be concerned with in
the rest of this paper. We denote with Rþ the set of positive real numbers.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let r ¼ ðr1; . . . ; rnÞ 2 ðRþÞn. Deﬁne for p = (p1, . . . , pn) 2 Dn,
trð pÞ :¼ ðr1p1; . . . ; rnpnÞ
Xn
i¼1
ripi
,
:
Let T n :¼ ftr j r 2 ðRþÞng.
Note that we have tr ¼ tr0 if r 0 is obtained from r by multiplying each component
with a constant a > 0. We can now formulate our main result.
Theorem 2.3. Let nP 3 and t be a transformation of Dn.
(i) t preserves sets of support and mixtures iff t 2 Tn.
(ii) t preserves cardinalities of support and mixtures iff t = t 0  p for some permutation
p and some t 0 2 Tn.The statements (i) and (ii) do not hold for n = 2: D2 can be identiﬁed with the
interval [0, 1], and every monotone bijection of [0, 1] satisﬁes (i) and (ii). A weak
form of a dual version of this theorem was already reported in [12]. The proof of
the theorem is given in Appendix A.1. The following examples illustrate how trans-
formations t 2 Tn can arise in practice.
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bicycles is investigated. To this end, a group of research assistants is sent out one day
to perform a traﬃc count on a number of main roads into the city. They are given
count sheets and short written instructions. Two diﬀerent sets of instructions were
produced in the preparation phase of the study: the ﬁrst set advised the assistants to
make one mark for every bus, car, and bicycle, respectively, in the appropriate
column of the count sheet. The second (more challenging) set of instructions
speciﬁed to make as many marks as there are actually people traveling in
(respectively on) the observed vehicles. By accident, some of the assistants were
handed instructions of the ﬁrst kind, others those of the second kind.
Assume that on all roads being watched in the study, the average number of
people traveling in a bus, car, or on a bicycle is the same, e.g. 10, 1.5, and 1.01,
respectively. Also assume that the number of vehicles observed on each road is so
large, that the actually observed numbers are very close to these averages.
Suppose, now, that we are more interested in the relative frequency of bus, car
and bicycle use, rather than in absolute counts. Suppose, too, that we prefer the
numbers that would have been produced by the use of the second set of instructions.
If, then, an assistant hands in counts that were produced using the ﬁrst set of
instructions, and that show frequencies f = (f1, f2, f3) 2 D3 for the three modes of
transportation, then we obtain the frequencies we really want by applying the
transformation tr with r = (10, 1.5, 1.01). Conversely, if we prefer the ﬁrst set of
instructions, and are given frequencies generated by the second, we can transform
them using r 0 = (1/10, 1/1.5, 1/1.01).
This example gives rise to a more general interpretation of transformations in Tn
as analogues in discrete settings to rescalings, or changes of units of measurements,
in a domain of continuous observables.
Example 2.5. Let S be a set of n possible diagnoses a doctor considers for one of his
patients. After interviewing the patient and conducting several preliminary exam-
inations, the doctor has arrived at a probability distribution p on S. He now
performs another test T on the patient. For each si 2 S the doctor knows with
certainty the probability that the test will give a positive result, given that si is the
correct diagnosis, i.e. he knows the probabilities
ri :¼ P ðT ¼ pos j siÞ: ð2Þ
Observing a positive result, the doctor will update his initial probability assignment
pi = P(si) to the new assignment p0i :¼ P ðsi jT ¼ posÞ ¼ riP ðsiÞ=P ðT ¼ posÞ. If the test
cannot exclude any diagnosis with certainty, i.e. ri > 0 for all i, then p
0 = trp with r
given by (2). Thus, the transformation tr describes the change induced on the prob-
ability assignment for the relevant state space S that is induced by conditioning on
T = pos in the expanded state space S · {T = pos, T = neg} (a similar transformation
describes the change induced by conditioning on T = neg).
Note that it is trivially true that the update from some particular prior p to a
posterior p 0 can be described by a transformation tr (provided p and p 0 have the same
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transformation tr is the same for all priors p.3. Noninformative priors
Bayesian statistical inference requires that a prior probability distribution is speci-
ﬁed on the set of parameters that determines a particular probability model. Herein
lies the advantage of Bayesian methods, because this prior can encode domain
knowledge that one has obtained before any data was observed. Often, however,
one would like to choose a prior distribution that represents the absence of any
knowledge: an ignorant or noninformative prior. The set Dn is the parameter set
for the multinomial probability model (for a ﬁxed sample size). The question of what
distribution on Dn represents a state of ignorance about this model has received
much attention, but no conclusive answer seems to exist.
Three possible solutions that most often are considered are: the uniform distribu-
tion, i.e. the distribution that has a constant density c with respect to Lebesgue meas-
ure, Jeﬀreys prior, which is given by the density c
Q
ip
1=2
i (where c is a suitable
normalizing constant), and Haldanes prior, given by density
Q
ip
1
i . Haldanes prior
(so named because it seems to have ﬁrst been suggested in [7]) is an improper prior,
i.e. it has an inﬁnite integral over Dn. All three distributions are Dirichlet distribu-
tions with parameters (1, . . . , 1), (1/2, . . . , 1/2), and (0, . . . , 0), respectively (in the
case of Haldanes distribution, the usual deﬁnition of a Dirichlet distribution has
to be extended so as to allow the parameters (0, . . . , 0)). Schafer [23] considers all
Dirichlet distributions with parameters (a, . . . , a) for 0 6 a 6 1 as possible candi-
dates for a noninformative prior.
The justiﬁcations for identifying any particular distribution as the appropriate
noninformative prior are typically based on invariance arguments: generally speak-
ing, ignorance is argued to be invariant under certain problem transformations, and
so the noninformative prior should be invariant under such problem transforma-
tions. There are diﬀerent types of problem transformations one can consider, each
leading to a diﬀerent concept of invariance, and often leading to diﬀerent results
as to what constitutes a noninformative prior (see [9] for a systematic overview).
In particular, there exist strong invariance-based arguments both for Jeﬀreys prior
[16], and for Haldanes prior [15,27]. Novick and Hall [17] derive Haldanes prior
by a diﬀerent type of argument. Skilling [25], on the other hand, rejects Haldanes
prior because it remains improper when updated by unreliable observations. In
the following, we present additional invariance-based arguments in support of Hal-
danes prior.
Example 3.1 (Continuation of Example 2.4). Assume that the true, long-term
relative frequencies of bus, car, and bicycle use are the same on all roads at which
the trafﬁc count is conducted (under both counting methods). Then the counts
obtained in the study are multinomial samples determined by a parameter f 1 2 D3 if
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used. Suppose the project leader, before seeing any counts, feels completely unable to
make any predictions on the results of the counts, i.e. he is completely ignorant
about the parameters f i .
When the samples are large (i.e. a great number of vehicles are observed on every
road), then the observed frequencies f obtained using instructions of type i are
expected to be very close to the true parameter f i . The prior probability Pr assigned
to a subset A  Dn then can be identiﬁed with a prior expectation of ﬁnding in the
actual counts relative frequencies f 2 A. If this prior expectation is to express
complete ignorance, then it must be the same for both sampling methods: being told
by the ﬁrst assistant returning with his counts that he had been using instructions of
type 2 will have no inﬂuence on the project leaders expectations regarding the
frequencies on this assistants count sheet. In particular, merely seeing the counts
handed in by this assistant will give the project leader no clue as to which instructions
were used by this assistant.
The parameters f i are related by f

2 ¼ trf 1, where tr is as in Example 2.4. Having
the same prior belief about f 2 as about f

1 means that for every A  D3 one has
Pr(A) = Pr(trA). A noninformative prior, thus, should be invariant under the
transformation tr. As the relation between f

1 and f

2 might also be given by some
other transformation in Tn, this invariance should actually hold for all these
transformations.
This example provides one intuitive justiﬁcation for requiring noninformative pri-
ors to be invariant under Tn-transforms. The next theorem states that this invariance
property only holds for Haldanes prior. In the formulation of the theorem a little
care has to be taken in dealing with the boundary of Dn, where the density of Hal-
danes prior is not deﬁned. We therefore restrict the statement of the theorem to
the prior on the interior of Dn, denoted intDn.
Theorem 3.2. Let Pr be a measure on intDn with Pr(intDn) > 0 and Pr(A) <1 for all
compact subsets A of intDn. Pr is invariant under all transformations tr 2 Tn iff Pr has
a density with respect to Lebesgue measure of the form c
Q
ip
1
i with some constant
c > 0.
Justiﬁcations for particular invariance concepts that are based on speciﬁc scenarios
like the one described in Example 3.1 always leave room for the possibility that diﬀer-
ent, similarly persuasive, scenarios can be constructed, which lead to diﬀerent invari-
ance concepts, and hence to diﬀerent noninformative priors. It is therefore important
that Theorems 2.3 and 3.2 together provide a justiﬁcation for Haldanes prior which is
somewhat more robust (but also more abstract): any invariance-based justiﬁcation for
a diﬀerent prior must be based on invariance under transformations that do not have
the preservation properties of Deﬁnition 2.1, and therefore can be argued to be less
natural or basic than the transformations from which Haldanes prior is derived.
Since Theorem 2.3 only is valid for nP 3 (whereas Theorem 3.2 also holds for
n = 2), this justiﬁcation, in principle, only applies for nP 3 (though it would seem
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n = 2).
To conclude this section, we brieﬂy review an earlier justiﬁcation for Haldanes
prior which was given by Jaynes [15]. This justiﬁcation is based on deriving a partic-
ular type of transformations from an intuitive scenario, very much as we did in
Example 3.1. It is developed by Jaynes only for n = 2, though it clearly generalizes
to nP 3. In the following we adopt Jayness notation and write (h, 1  h) for a bino-
mial distribution with ‘‘success probability’’ h (rather than writing (p0, p1)).
The basis for Jayness justiﬁcation is an intuitive interpretation of a noninforma-
tive prior as a distribution of beliefs about the true value of h that one would ﬁnd in
‘‘a population in a state of total confusion’’: according to this interpretation one as-
sumes that there exists a population I of individuals i, and each individual believes
the value of h to be hi 2 [0, 1]. The distribution of beliefs in the population I, thus,
gives rise to a density f(h) on [0, 1]. This density can be interpreted as a noninforma-
tive prior when the individuals i 2 I base their beliefs on ‘‘diﬀerent and conﬂicting
information’’, and, thus, the population as a whole is in a state of ‘‘total confusion’’.
Jayness argument then is that such a state of total confusion will remain to be the
same when some piece of evidence E is given to all individuals, and each individual
updates his or her beliefs by conditioning on E. By a suitable formalization of this
scenario, Jaynes shows that a single individuals transition from an original belief
h to the new belief h 0 is given by
h0 7! ah=ð1 hþ ahÞ: ð3Þ
This can easily be seen as a transformation from our group T2 (note the similarity
between this derivation of a T2-transformation and our Example 2.5). The assump-
tion of a collective state of ignorance being invariant under assimilation of the evi-
dence E leads to the condition of invariance of f under the transformation (3). 1
Jaynes then proceeds to show that only Haldanes prior is invariant under these
transformations (which is the special case n = 2 of our Theorem 3.2).4. Equivariant measure selection
A fundamental probabilistic inference problem is the problem of measure selec-
tion: given some incomplete information about the true distribution p on S, what
is the best rational hypothesis for the precise value of p?
Example 4.1 (Continuation of Example 2.4). One of the research assistants has lost
his count sheet on his way home. Unwilling to discard the data from the road
watched by this assistant, the project leader tries to extract some information about1 In Jayness presentation the factor a is originally deﬁned so as to be dependent on the particular
individual whose belief change is given by (3). The further arguments implicitly assume that a is a common
constant for all individuals.
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observed at least 10 times as many cars as buses, and at least 5 times as many cars as
buses and bicycles combined. The only way to enter the observation from this
particular road into the study, however, is in the form of accurate relative
frequencies of bus, car, and bicycle use. To this end, the project leader has to make a
best guess of the actual frequencies based on the linear constraints given to him by
the assistant.Example 4.2 (Continuation of Example 2.5). The doctors distribution p on possible
diagnoses will usually be the result of a measure selection process: each examination
or test he performs on the patient will provide some partial information, e.g.:
‘‘(according to this test result) diagnosis s is twice as probable as diagnosis s 0’’. All
results combined leave the doctor with a set of possible distributions p consistent
with his information. To decide on the best of a number of different therapies
(potentially inﬁnitely many—each associated with different success probabilities
and side effects), however, the doctor has to choose a unique p to express his beliefs
about the correct diagnosis.
The general formulation of the measure selection problem given above admits of a
number of diﬀerent more precise problem speciﬁcations. In particular, one can dis-
tinguish diﬀerent variants of the general problem according to the nature of the dis-
tribution p, and the nature of the incomplete information available about p. Several
solutions that have been proposed for the measure selection problem are based on
quite diﬀerent interpretations of p and incomplete information [24,20,12]. In order
to clarify the role of the equivariance principle that we will propose as a desideratum
for measure selection rules, we ﬁrst take a closer look at these diﬀerent
interpretations.
4.1. Variants of the measure selection problem
We ﬁrst make some general assumptions on the purely mathematical form of
incomplete information about p, and the measure selection problem: one assumption
is that incomplete information consists of a set c = c1, . . . , ck of linear constraints on
p, i.e. linear inequalities of the form
ci;1p1 þ    þ ci;npn 6 ci;0 ð1 6 i 6 kÞ
with real coeﬃcients ci,j. This is quite a restrictive assumption on what types of
incomplete information are to be considered, as it excludes e.g. independence con-
straints of the form ‘‘events A and B are independent’’. In spite of this restrictiveness,
the limitation to linear constraints usually has to be made in order to make the meas-
ure selection problem at all feasible.
A set c of linear constraints deﬁnes the set D(c)  Dn of distributions that satisfy
all constraints (the solution set of c). One possible mathematical formulation of the
measure selection problem now is
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empty subsets sel(c)  Dn.
This formalization, on the one hand, is very strong in that it requires sel to be deﬁned
for all, even inconsistent, sets of constraints; on the other hand it is very weak in that
sel(c) is allowed to be a subset of Dn, rather than a unique element, and, moreover, it
is not required that sel(c)  D(c) (which would be incompatible with the requirement
that sel also is deﬁned for inconsistent c). An alternative, more traditional formali-
zation of the problem is
(Sel 2) deﬁne a selection function sel that maps consistent sets c of linear constraints
to points sel(c) 2 D(c).
Identifying a set of constraints c with its solution set D(c), and generalizing from such
polytopes to arbitrary closed and convex subsets A  Dn, one can ﬁnally put the
problem in the following form:
(Sel 3) deﬁne a selection function sel that maps nonempty, closed and convex sub-
sets A  Dn to points sel(A) 2 A.
Sel 1–3 are purely mathematical formalizations of the problem which do not di-
rectly represent any speciﬁc interpretations of the nature of p, or the constraints c.
However, which of these formalizations is most appropriate is partly determined
by the interpretation given to p and c.
First turning to p, we can distinguish the cases that p represents a statistical,
observable probability, or that p represents a subjective probability (degree of belief).
These two diﬀerent types of distributions give rise to two distinct interpretations of
the ‘‘true’’ distribution p that we want to identify by measure selection: In the case of
statistical probabilities the ‘‘true’’ p describes actual long-run frequencies, which, in
principle, given suﬃcient time and experimental resources, one could determine ex-
actly. In the case of subjective probability, the ‘‘true’’ p is a rational belief state that
an ideal intelligent agent would arrive at by properly taking into account all its cur-
rent, incomplete knowledge.
A second dichotomy arises through diﬀerent interpretations of the nature of the
constraints c: these can either be seen as a complete description of a state of infor-
mation, or as randomly sampled pieces of (possibly unreliable) information. This dis-
tinction between constraints as knowledge and constraints as data was introduced in
[12]. It is a distinction that is independent from the distinction between statistical and
subjective probabilities p. The following examples illustrate all four combinations of
interpretations for p and c.
Example 4.3 (Statistical probabilities, constraints as data). Let p be a probability
distribution in a medical domain that represents relative frequencies of certain
diseases and symptoms. A linear constraint can, for instance, provide an upper
bound on the probability of disease D given symptom S. We can now obtain a great
number of such constraints by evaluating patient data from different hospitals and/
or by interviewing numerous medical experts. Each individual constraint we elicit in
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distribution p that describes the actual relative frequencies in the population we
actually want to model. Note that constraints obtained in this manner can easily be
inconsistent (patient data from different hospitals may show quite different
conditional probabilities). Note, too, that we will probably have greater conﬁdence
in, and pay more attention to, constraints that we have observed multiple times (e.g.
the conditional probability of D given S has been determined for many different
hospitals, and similar values have been found in all cases) than ‘‘isolated’’ constraints
(e.g. a conditional probability for D 0 given S 0 has only been mentioned by one
expert, and not been corroborated otherwise).Example 4.4 (Statistical probabilities, constraints as knowledge). Let p be as in the
preceding example, but now suppose that the constraints are obtained by systemat-
ically interviewing a single expert, for instance by requiring him to state for every
possible conditional probability in the domain a best lower and upper bound,
according to his knowledge.Example 4.5 (Subjective probabilities, constraints as data). Let p represent the sub-
jective probabilities some European football enthusiast holds about the results in the
upcoming champions league season. Suppose we meet this fan at some late hour in
the local pub, and that the conversation turns to football. Every now and then he will
make a statement that, in effect, is a linear constraint on p: ‘‘Barcelona has at least
twice the chance of reaching the ﬁnals that Madrid has’’, ‘‘Id bet 10:1 that Bayern
Munich will exit in the ﬁrst round again—no, make that 20:1’’, . . . As in Example
4.3, the constraints so obtained can be interpreted as randomly sampled pieces of evi-
dence on the true beliefs p. As before, these constraints can be inconsistent, and we
will pay greater attention to those constraints that have been consistently repeated
several times.Example 4.6 (Subjective probabilities, constraints as knowledge). Let p be the beliefs
held by a professional bookmaker on the results in the upcoming champions league
season. Before the season starts, he offers certain odds on some possible bets, e.g.
10:1 that Madrid will reach the semiﬁnals. Assuming the bookmaker to be rational,
we can interpret these odds as constraints on his beliefs p (the probability that
Madrid will reach the semiﬁnals is at most 0.1). As the bookmaker will aim to offer
bets on all events for which he believes to have some reasonable probability assess-
ment, and will also want to offer competitive odds, one can view the collection of
bets he offers as a complete description of his state of knowledge.
Clearly, in any given situation it need not be obvious whether the constraints as
data or constraints as knowledge interpretation is more appropriate—both inter-
pretations are idealizations that will never be encountered in a pure form in reality.
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straints is the right one is to decide whether one should base measure selection
on the raw set of observed constraints c, taking into account possible multiple
occurrences of the same constraint, or whether D(c) alone already encodes all the
relevant information provided by c. This also means that under the constraints
as data interpretation the mathematical shape of the measure selection problem
is (Sel 1), whereas under the constraints as knowledge interpretation (Sel 2) and
(Sel 3) are more natural.
More important than the technicalities of the problem formalization, however, is
the question whether the diﬀerent interpretations for p and c will lead to completely
diﬀerent solution paradigms, or whether the same formal selection rules are appro-
priate in all cases. Paris [21,19] emphasizes that the principles he postulates for meas-
ure selection are meant to apply to subjective probabilities p and the constraints as
knowledge interpretation only. In [12], on the other hand, it has been argued that the
constraints as data perspective requires diﬀerent selection principles than the con-
straints as knowledge perspective. This is already supported by the discussion of
Examples 4.3–4.6, where we saw that the constraints as data perspective leads to
selection rules that must be sensitive to multiple occurrences of identical constraints,
but under the constraints as knowledge perspective such multiplicities would be
ignored.
However, in contrast to Paris, we see no reason to believe that measure selection
for subjective probabilities should follow diﬀerent principles than measure selection
for statistical probabilities. This is supported by a uniform philosophical interpreta-
tion of measure selection for statistical and subjective probabilities: as already ob-
served above, in the statistical case, the ‘‘true’’ p represents unobserved long-run
frequencies. Measure selection for statistical probabilities can then be seen as a pre-
diction on actual long-run frequencies that, in principle, one would be able to ob-
serve in a suitable experimental setup (or simply by making observations over a
suﬃciently long period of time).
Measure selection for subjective probabilities admits of a quite similar interpreta-
tion: following earlier suggestions of a frequency basis for subjective probability
[22,2], it is argued in [11] that subjective probability is ultimately grounded in empir-
ical observation, hence statistical probability. In particular, in [11] the process of
subjective measure selection is interpreted as a process very similar to statistical
measure selection, namely a prediction on the outcome of hypothetical experiments
(which, however, here even unlimited experimental resources may not permit us to
carry out in practice). Under the uniform interpretation of statistical and subjective
measure selection as a prediction of frequencies in (hypothetical) experiments, it
seems reasonable that both selection processes should follow the same formal rules.
This is furthermore supported by the observation that Shore and Johnson [24] on the
one hand, and Paris and Vencovska´ [20] on the other hand, derive very similar prin-
ciples for measure selection, but Shore and Johnson assumed statistical probabilities,
whereas Paris and Vencovska´ consider subjective probabilities.
We can summarize our perspective on the measure selection problem by the fol-
lowing three hypotheses. The ﬁrst two summarize the preceding discussion; the third
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[12].
• Selection rules under the constraints as data interpretation are diﬀerent from
selection rules under the constraints as knowledge interpretation.
• Under either interpretation for the constraints, the same selection rules are appli-
cable to statistical and subjective probabilities.
• The equivariance principle, introduced below, is applicable (in slightly diﬀerent
forms) under both interpretations for the constraints.
4.2. Equivariance principle
In the following we focus on the measure selection problem under the constraints
as knowledge perspective, taking (Sel 3) to be its mathematical structure. We pro-
pose an equivariance principle for this setting. An analogous principle adapted to
the constraints as data perspective and the mathematical form (Sel 1) is described
in [12]. Additional results relevant for the constraints as data case (including a dual
version of the representation theorem that is more directly geared towards the needs
of measure selection under constraints as data than the formulation of Theorem 2.3)
can be found in [14].
The most widely favored solution to the measure selection problem under the con-
straints as knowledge interpretation is the entropy maximization rule: deﬁne selme(A)
to be the distribution p in A that has maximal entropy (for closed and convex A this
is well-deﬁned). Axiomatic justiﬁcations for this selection rule are given in [24,20].
Both these works postulate a number of formal principles that a selection rule should
obey, and then proceed to show that entropy maximization is the only rule satisfying
all the principles. Paris [18] argues that all these principles, in essence, are just expres-
sions of one more general underlying principle, which is expressed by an informal
statement (or slogan) by van Fraassen [26]: Essentially similar problems should have
essentially similar solutions.
In spite of its mathematical sound derivation, entropy maximization does exhibit
some behaviors that appear counterintuitive to many (see [12] for two illustrative
examples). Often this counterintuitive behavior is due to the fact that the maximum
entropy rule has a strong bias towards the uniform distribution u = (1/n, . . . , 1/n). As
u is the element in Dn with globally maximal entropy, u will be selected whenever
u 2 A. Consider, for example, Fig. 1(i) and (ii). Shown are two diﬀerent subsets A
and A 0 of D3. Both contain u, and therefore selme(A) = selme(A 0) = u. While none
of Paris rationality principles explicitly demands that u should be selected whenever
possible, there is one principle that directly implies the following for the sets depicted
in Fig. 1: assuming that sel(A) = u, and realizing that A 0 is a subset of A, one should
also have sel(A 0) = u. This is an instance of what Paris [21] calls the obstinacy prin-
ciple: for any A, A 0 with A 0  A and sel(A) 2 A 0 it is required that sel(A 0) = sel(A).
The intuitive justiﬁcation for this is that additional information (i.e. information that
limits the previously considered distribution A to A 0) that is consistent with the
uu
(i)
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(iii)
(iv)
A
A'
A1
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(v)
Fig. 1. Maximum entropy and Tn-equivariant selection.
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selection. While quite convincing from a default reasoning perspective (in fact, it
is a version of Gabbays [5] restricted monotonicity principle), it is not entirely clear
that this principle is an expression of the van Fraassen slogan. Indeed, at least from a
geometric point of view, there does seem to exist little similarity between the two
problems given by A and A 0, and thus the requirement that they should have similar
solutions (or even the same solution) hardly seems a necessary consequence of the
van Fraassen slogan.
An alternative selection rule that avoids some of the shortcomings of selme is the
center of mass selection rule selcm: selcm(A) is deﬁned as the center of mass of A. With
selcm one avoids the bias towards u, and, more generally, the bias of selme towards
points on the boundary of the input set A is reversed towards an exclusive preference
for points in the interior of A. A great part of the intuitive appeal of selcm is probably
owed to the fact that it is translation equivariant, i.e. (1) is satisﬁed with sol = selcm
and i = A.
Such an equivariance property can be understood as a much more direct formal-
ization of the van Fraassen slogan than the individual postulates proposed in the
derivations of the maximum entropy principle. Indeed, van Fraassen [26], after giv-
ing the informal slogan, proceeds to explain it further as a general symmetry require-
ment of the form
hðRðAÞÞ ¼ RðhðAÞÞ; ð4Þ
where A is the input to some inference problem, R is a solution rule for the problem,
and h is some problem transformation [26, p. 260]. This symmetry requirement, thus,
is a very general principle that can be applied to many diﬀerent types of inference
problems. The equivariance principle (1) is a special form of (4) with h the translation
by r. For our special measure selection problem we have that A is any closed and
convex subset of Dn, and R is a selection rule. To apply van Fraassens general sym-
metry requirement to our special problem, it thus remains to specify the transforma-
tion(s) h for which (4) should be required.
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relevant transformations to consider in our problem setting, so that we arrive at the
following Tn-equivariance principle for selection rules:
For all tr 2 T n : selðtrAÞ ¼ trselðAÞ: ð5Þ
Fig. 1(iii)–(v) illustrates the Tn-equivariance principle: shown are three diﬀerent
transformations A1, A2, A3 of a polytope deﬁned by three linear constraints, and
the corresponding transformations p1, p2, p3 of one distinguished element inside
the Ai. Tn-equivariance now demands that selðA1Þ ¼ p1 () selðA2Þ ¼ p2 ()
selðA3Þ ¼ p3. The following example provides an intuitive justiﬁcation for requiring
Tn-equivariant selection rules.
Example 4.7 (Continuation of Example 4.2). Let c be the set of constraints the
doctor obtains through his initial interview and examinations. By a measure
selection process he obtains the distribution p expressing his precise degrees of belief
for the different diagnoses. Now he performs the test T and obtains a positive result.
He now has two ways to combine this new evidence with his previous reasoning: he
can ﬁrst integrate the new evidence with his original partial information by
conditioning each distribution q in A = D(c) on T = pos, thus obtaining a new set
A 0 = tr(A) of possible distributions, and then perform measure selection on A 0.
Alternatively, he can simply condition his already selected distribution p on T = pos.
If the doctors measure selection rule is Tn-equivariant, then both ways will lead to
the same result p 0 = trp.
Tn-equivariance imposes no restriction on what sel(Ai) should be for any single Ai
in Fig. 1. It only determines how the selections for the diﬀerent Ai should be related.
This principle alone, thus, is far from providing a unique selection rule, like the
rationality principles of Paris and Vencovska´ [20]. On the other hand, we have not
yet shown that Tn-equivariant selection rules even exist. This will be the subject of
the remainder of this section where we construct a concrete selection rule.
From (5) one immediately derives a limitation of possible Tn-equivariant selection
rules: let A = Dn in (5). Then trA = A for every tr 2 Tn, and equivariance demands
that trsel(A) = sel(A) for all tr, i.e. sel(A) has to be a ﬁxpoint under all transforma-
tions. The only elements of Dn that have this property are the n vertices v1, . . . , vn,
where vi is the distribution that assigns unit probability to si 2 S. Clearly a rule with
sel(Dn) = vi for any particular i would be completely arbitrary, and could not be ar-
gued to follow any rationality principles (more technically, such a rule would not be
permutation equivariant, which is another equivariance property one would demand
in order to deal appropriately with reorderings of the state space, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2).
Similar problems arise whenever sel is to be applied to some A  Dn that is invar-
iant under some transformations of Tn. To evade these diﬃculties, we restrict in the
following the domain of sel to sets A that are not invariant under any transforma-
tion tr (except the identity transformation). LetA denote the set of closed and con-
vex A that are contained in the interior of Dn (i.e. support(p) = {1, . . . , n} for all
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One can show that A 2A are not invariant under any nontrivial tr 2 Tn (A is not the
most general class of sets with this property, and the following construction can also
be extended to more general classes).
We ﬁrst consider the special case n = 2. We identify D2 with the interval [0, 1] via
the mapping (p0, p1) # p0. Then A consists of all closed intervals [l, u] with
0 < l < u < 1. Out of symmetry considerations, one will require from a selection rule
that
selð½a; 1 aÞ ¼ 1=2 ð0 < a < 1=2Þ: ð6Þ
One can show that for
r ¼ ðð1 uÞð1 lÞl
3u3Þ1=4
lu
the interval [l, u] is transformed by tr into a symmetric interval of the form [a, 1  a].
Both this symmetric transform and the transformation tr are unique for the given
[l, u]. Assuming (6), then selð½l; uÞ ¼ t1r ð1=2Þ, which is explicitly given by a
selð½l; uÞ ¼ l
2u2ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
l3u3ð1 lÞð1 uÞ
q
þ l2u2
: ð7Þ
Fig. 2 illustrates the value of sel([l, u]) as a function of l for the two ﬁxed values
u = 0.5 and u = 0.99.
Thus, for n = 2 there exists a unique T2-equivariant selection rule that also satis-
ﬁes (6). This uniqueness result, however, comes with two qualiﬁcations: ﬁrst it must
be remembered that Theorem 2.3 does not apply for n = 2, so that Tn-equivariance
does not carry the same weight for n = 2 as for nP 3. Second, this uniqueness result
only applies to the case where the input of the selection process is an interval [l, u],
i.e. we are here considering the form (Sel 3) of selection problem, which is appropri-
ate under the constraints as knowledge only. Under the constraints as data interpre-
tation, we have as possible inputs to the selection process arbitrary collections
{liji = 1, . . . , k}, {ujjj = 1, . . . , l} of lower and upper bounds. For this more general
class of inputs no uniqueness result holds.
Following basically the same construction leading to (7), we can deﬁne Tn-equi-
variant rules for nP 3.
We begin by deﬁning on A an equivalence relation :
A  A0 : () 9tr 2 T n : A0 ¼ trA:
The equivalence class orb(A) := {A 0jA 0  A} (={trAjtr 2 Tn}) is called the orbit of
A (these are standard deﬁnitions). It is easy to verify that for A 2A also
orbðAÞ A, and that for every A 0 2 orb(A) there is a unique tr 2 Tn with A 0 = trA.2 The notation here is slightly modiﬁed from the one used in [13].
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Fig. 2. T2-equivariant selection.
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by equivariance sel(trA) = u. It follows that in every orbit there must be some set
A 0 with sel(A 0) = u. On the other hand, if sel(A 0) = u, then this uniquely deﬁnes sel(A)
for all A in the orbit of A 0: sel(A) = p, where p = tru with tr the unique transformation
with trA
0 = A. One thus sees that the deﬁnition of an equivariant selection rule is
equivalent to choosing for each orbit in A a representative A 0 for which sel(A 0) = u
shall hold.
In the case n = 2 an orbit consists just of the set of all intervals [l, u] that can be
transformed into the same symmetric interval [a, 1  a], and this symmetric element
is the orbits representative A 0 with sel(A 0) = u.
For nP 3 it is no longer so straightforward to identify the representative A 0, be-
cause now not every A 2A has a transform that is symmetric in a similarly strong
sense as an interval [a, 1  a]. For this reason there does not seem to exists a single
principle like (6) that together with Tn-equivariance determines a unique selection
rule. However, we can generalize the intuition we followed in the n = 2 case by trying
to identify, for each orbit, the maximally symmetric representative A 0. In the follow-
ing we base this identiﬁcation on the condition that u is the center of mass of A 0.
For A 2A we denote with chm(A) the center of mass of A with respect to Hal-
danes prior H. Thus, p = chm(A) iﬀ for i = 1, . . . , n:
pi ¼
Z
A
p0i dHðp0iÞ=HðAÞ: ð8Þ
Since A is full-dimensional, closed, and contained in the interior of Dn, one has
0 < H(A) <1, so that the pi are well-deﬁned.
Lemma 4.8. Let A 2A. There exists a unique A 0 2 orb(A) with chm(A 0) = u.
By this lemma the following is a well-deﬁned selection rule for A 2A:
selequivchmðAÞ ¼ p : () A ¼ trA0; chmðA0Þ ¼ u; and p ¼ tru:
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ticular, it is not the case that selequiv-chm(A) = chm(A) (the intuitively appealing rule
sel(A) = chm(A) is not Tn-equivariant).
In [13] the same construction as given here was sketched using center-of-mass with
respect to Lebesgue measure instead of Haldanes prior. While the analogue of Lem-
ma 4.8 might be expected to also hold for cm in place of chm, this appears to be much
harder to prove, so that at this point it must be considered an open question whether
the construction also works for cm.5. Conclusions
Many probabilistic inference problems that are characterized by a lack of infor-
mation have to be solved on the basis of considerations of symmetries and invari-
ances. These symmetries and invariances, in turn, can be deﬁned in terms of
transformations of the mathematical objects one encounters in the given type of
inference problem.
The representation theorem we have derived provides a strong argument that in
inference problems whose objects are elements and subsets of Dn, one should pay
particular attention to invariances (and equivariances) under the transformations
Tn. These transformations can be seen as the analogue in the space D
n of translations
in the space Rn.
One should be particularly aware of the fact that it usually does not make sense to
simply restrict symmetry and invariance concepts that are appropriate in the space
Rn to the subset Dn. A case in point is the problem of noninformative priors. In
Rn Lebesgue measure is the canonical choice for an (improper) noninformative prior,
because its invariance under translations makes it the unique (up to a constant) ‘‘uni-
form’’ distribution. Restricted to Dn, however, this distinction of Lebesgue measure
does not carry much weight, as translations are not a meaningful transformation of
Dn. Our results indicate that the choice of Haldanes prior for Dn is much more in line
with the choice of Lebesgue measure on Rn, than the choice of the ‘‘uniform’’ distri-
bution, i.e. Lebesgue measure restricted to Dn.
In a similar vein, we have conjectured in Section 4 that some of the intuitive ap-
peal of the center-of-mass selection rule is its equivariance under translations. Again,
however, translations are not the right transformations to consider in this context,
and one therefore should aim to construct Tn-equivariant selection rules. Tn-equivar-
iance, in this context, is furthermore supported by the intuitive desideratum that
measure selection should permute with conditioning in an extended state space.
An interesting open question is how many of Paris and Vencovska´s [20] ration-
ality principles can be reconciled with Tn-equivariance. As the combination of all un-
iquely identiﬁes maximum entropy selection, there must always be some that are
violated by Tn-equivariant selection rules. Clearly the obstinacy principle is rather
at odds with Tn-equivariance (though it is not immediately obvious that the two
really are inconsistent). Can one ﬁnd Tn-equivariant selection rules that satisfy most
(or all) principles except obstinacy?
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A.1. Proofs for Sections 2–4.Theorem 2.3. Let nP 3 and t be a transformation of Dn.
(i) t preserves sets of support and mixtures iff t 2 Tn.
(ii) t preserves cardinalities of support and mixtures iff t = t 0  p for some permutation
p and some t 0 2 Tn.Proof. (i) For x 2 ðRþÞn we denote with [x] the linear subspace of Rn generated by x.
We use Rn1Q to denote the ﬁrst quadrant of R
n, i.e. the set of all points with only non-
negative coordinates. With Pn1 we denote the set of all one-dimensional linear sub-
spaces of Rn, i.e. the (n  1)-dimensional projective space over R. Furthermore, with
Pn11Q we denote the subset of P
n1 containing those subspaces that intersect Rn1Q not
only in 0. Thus,
Pn11Q ¼ f½p jp 2 Dng;
and, moreover, every ½x 2 Pn11Q is uniquely represented by one p 2 Dn. The transfor-
mation t, therefore, immediately induces a (bijective) transformation onPn11Q , which,
for simplicity, we also denote with t.
The main part of the proof now consists of showing that t can be extended to a
linear transformation t* of Rn1Q. The arguments used to establish this closely follow
the proofs of the representation theorem for projective colineations (also known as
the fundamental theorem of projective geometry) as given in [4,1]. That represen-
tation theorem states that every transformation t on Pn1 that preserves colinearity
is induced by a linear transformation t* of Rn. Here we show basically a version of
this result that, on the one hand, is restricted to Pn11Q and R
n
1Q, and, on the other
hand, starts with the slightly stronger requirement of preservation of mixtures, rather
than preservation of colinearity (the former requires also that the relative order of
colinear points is preserved). The main work in adapting the proof of the
representation theorem for colineations to our problem consists of making sure
that all geometric constructions in the original proof can be contained within the
subset Pn11Q . Since large parts of the resulting proof are virtually identical to the
originals, we here give it in fairly condensed form.
We require some additional notation: [x, y] stands for the linear subspace
generated by x and y. If x and y are linearly independent, this is a two-dimensional
plane, which, in projective geometry terms, is the line connecting [x] and [y]. We say
that subspaces [x1], . . . , [xk] are linearly independent if the xi are linearly independent.
A vector z 2 Rn1Q is a positive combination of x; y 2 Rn1Q if there exists a; b 2 Rþ with
z = ax + by. In that case we also say that [z] is a positive combination of [x] and [y].
Observe that the mixture preservation property of t just means that t[z] is a positive
combination of t[x] and t[y] whenever z is a positive combination of x and y.
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10.1.1 and 10.1.2 in [4]).Lemma A.1
(A) Let x; y; z 2 Rn1Q such that x, y are linearly independent, and z is a positive
combination of x and y. Then there exists exactly one ~y 2 ½y \ Rn1Q with
xþ ~y 2 ½z.
(B) Let t[x1], t[x2], t[x3] be linearly independent, and let yi 2 t[xi] (i = 1, 2, 3)
such that
t½x1 þ x2 ¼ ½y1 þ y2 and t½x1 þ x3 ¼ ½y1 þ y3:
Then
t½x2 þ x3 ¼ ½y2 þ y3 and t½x1 þ x2 þ x3 ¼ ½y1 þ y2 þ y3:Proof. (A) Independent from n, this is a statement only about the plane spanned
by x, y, z. The construction of ~y, therefore is illustrated in full generality by
Fig. 3.
(B) x1 + x2 + x3 is a positive combination of x1 and x2 + x3. It follows that
t[x1 + x2 + x3] is a positive combination of t[x1] and t[x2 + x3], and that t[x2 + x3] is
in the linear subspace generated by t[x1] and t[x1 + x2 + x3], i.e.
t½x2 þ x3  ½y1; y1 þ y2 þ y3: ðA:1Þ[y]
[z]
[x]
x
y~
Fig. 3. Lemma A.1(A).
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t½x2 þ x3  ½y2; y3; ðA:2Þ
t½x1 þ x2 þ x3  ½y1 þ y2; y3; ðA:3Þ
t½x1 þ x2 þ x3  ½y1 þ y3; y2: ðA:4Þ
Taking the intersections of the right-hand sides of (A.1) and (A.2), respectively (A.3)
and (A.4), one obtains from the linear independence of the yi that
t[x2 + x3]  [y2 + y3] and t[x1 + x2 + x3]  [y1 + y2 + y3]. Since both sides of these
inclusions are one-dimensional linear subspaces, equality holds. h
Let a1, a2, a3 be such that t[a1], t[a2], t[a3] are linearly independent. Let [b1] = t[a1].
We have that t[a1 + a2] is a positive combination of t[a1] and t[a2], so that by part (A)
of the lemma there exists a unique b2 2 t[a2] such that t[a1 + a2] = [b1 + b2]. Similarly,
there exists a unique b3 2 t[a3] with t[a1 + a3] = [b1 + b3]. With part (B) of the lemma
it furthermore follows that t[a2 + a3] = [b2 + b3].
We can now deﬁne t*: ﬁrst, deﬁne t*(0) := 0. Now let x 2 Rn1Q n 0. Let
ai 2 {a1, a2, a3} such that t[ai]5 [x]. Then t[ai + x] is a positive combination of
t[ai] and t[x], so that by part (A) of the lemma there exists a unique z 2 t½x \ Rn1Q
with [bi + z] = t[ai + x]. Deﬁne t*(x) := z.
We have to show that the deﬁnition of t*(x) does not depend on the particular
choice of ai. For this, assume that t[ai]5 [x]5 t[aj], and that by above construction
we have obtained zi, zj with [bi + zi] = t[ai + x], [bj + zj] = t[aj + x].
To show that zi = zj ﬁrst consider the case that t[x] 62 [t[ai], t[aj]]. Applying part (B)
of the lemma to x1 = ai, x2 = x, x3 = aj and y1 = bi, y2 = z1, y3 = bj, one obtains
t[aj + x] = [bj + zi] and hence by the uniqueness statement of part (A) of the lemma
zi = zj.
In the case t[x] 2 [t[ai], t[aj]] we obtain from the linear independence of the t[ai]
that t[x] 62 [t[ai], t[ak]] [ [t[aj], t[ak]] where k = {1, 2, 3}n{i, j}. In particular, t[ak]5
t[x], so that zk is deﬁned by our construction. Applying the ﬁrst case twice we obtain
zi = zk = zj.
We next proceed to show that t*(x + y) = t*(x) + t*(y) for all x; y 2 Rn1Q. For this,
ﬁrst assume that t*(x) and t*(y) are linearly independent. There exists ai (i 2
{1, 2, 3}) with t[ai] 6 [t[x], t[y]]. Applying part (B) of the lemma to x1 = ai, x2 = x,
x3 = y and y1 = bi, y2 = t*(x),y3 = t*(y) one obtains t[x + y] = [t*(x) + t*(y)] and
t[ai + x + y] = [bi + t*(x) + t*(y)]. As t[ai]5 t[x + y] therefore t*(x + y) = t*(x) +
t*(y).
Now assume that [t*(x)] = [t*(y)], and hence t[x] = t[y] and [x] = [y]. Choose any z
such that t*(z) is linearly independent from t*(x + y) (and therefore also from t*(x)
and t*(y)). Then also t*(x) and t*(y + z) are linearly independent, because [x]5
[y + z]. Applying the previous case twice, we obtain on the one hand t*(x + y +
z) = t*(x + y) + t*(z), and on the other hand t*(x + y + z) = t*(y + z) + t*(x) =
t*(y) + t*(z) + t*(x).
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t*(ax) = bt*(x), where b ¼ bxðaÞ 2 Rþ might depend both on a and on x. We ﬁrst
show that b does not depend on x, i.e. bx(a) = by(a) for all x, y. For this, ﬁrst assume
that [x]5 [y]. By additivity we have on the one hand t*(a(x + y)) = bx(a)t*(x) +
by(a)t*(y), and on the other hand t*(a(x + y)) = bx+y(a)(t*(x) + t*(y)). From the lin-
ear independence of t*(x) and t*(y) it follows that bx(a) = bx+y(a) = by(a).
If [x] = [y] we pick z with [z]5 [x] and obtain with the previous case
bx(a) = bz(a) = by(a).
It remains to show that b(a) = a. For this, we ﬁrst show that b(a1 + a2) = b(a1) +
b(a2). For this, let x be any point. Then b(a1 + a2)t*(x) = t*(a1x + a2x) =
b(a1)t*(x) + b(a2)t*(x). Similarly, we obtain b(a1a2)t*(x) = t*(a1a2x) = b(a1)t*
(a2x) = b(a1)b(a2)t*(x), so that b(a1a2) = b(a1)b(a2).
As b is not identically zero, the multiplicativity of b implies that b(a)5 0 for all
a5 0. Also by multiplicativity, b(1) = 1. From additivity and multiplicativity we
then obtain b(n) = n and b(1/n) = 1/n for all n 2 N, and hence b(a) = a for all
a 2 Qþ. Finally, from additivity and b(a)P 0 for all a, we obtain that a6a 0 implies
b(a)6b(a 0). With b restricted toQþ being the identity, this implies that b is in fact the
identity on all Rþ. This concludes the proof that t*(ax) = at*(x).
Let ei be the ith unit vector, i.e. ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with 1 in the ith compo-
nent. As the transformation t preserves sets of support, we have t[ei] = [ei], and hence
t*(ei) = riei for some ri 2 Rþ. For x ¼
P
ixiei then t
ðxÞ ¼Pirixiei. In particular, for
p 2 Dn we have tðpÞ ¼Piripiei 2 t½p. As, furthermore, t(p) 2 t[p], where t(p) is the
original transformation on Dn, and t[p] the induced transformation on Pn11Q , we have
tðpÞ ¼ tðpÞ=Piripi ¼ gr for r = (r1, . . . , rn).
Since t preserves cardinalities of support, we have that t(ei) = ep(i) for some permu-
tation p of 1, . . . , n. Using the preservation of mixtures it is straightforward to show
by induction on k that p 2 Dn with support {i1, . . . , ik}  {1, . . . , n} is transformed to
some p 0 with support(p 0) = {p(i1), . . . , p(ik)}. The transformation t can thus be
decomposed into the form t 0  p, where t 0 preserves sets of support and mixtures,
i.e. t 0 2 Tn by (i). h
Theorem 3.2. Let Pr be a measure on intDn with Pr(intDn) > 0 and Pr(A) <1 for
all compact subsets A of intDn. Pr is invariant under all transformations tr 2 Tn iff Pr
has a density with respect to Lebesgue measure of the form c
Q
ip
1
i with some constant
c > 0.Proof. We ﬁrst show the invariance of distributions Pr given by densities gcðpÞ :¼
c
Q
ip
1
i . It is sufﬁcient to consider the case c = 1. We write g for g1. Furthermore,
we may restrict attention to transformations tr given by vectors r with ri = 1 in all
but one coordinate i. General tr can be obtained as compositions of such primitive
transformations, and therefore the invariance of Pr under each primitive transforma-
tion implies invariance under all transformations. Moreover, without loss of gener-
ality, we may take r = (r,1, . . . , 1). In the following we write t for this tr:
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Xn
i¼2
pi
 !,
ðrp1; p2; . . . ; pnÞ:
Saying that a distribution Pr on Dn has density g means that Dn is identiﬁed as a
subset of the (n  1)-dimensional afﬁne space L :¼ fx 2 Rn jP xi ¼ 1g, and that g is
a density with respect to (n  1)-dimensional Lebesgue measure on this space. To
simplify the parameterization of our problem, we can identify L with Rn1 via the
embedding
p : x1; . . . ; xn1; 1
Xn1
i¼1
xi
 !
7! ðx1; . . . ; xn1Þ:
This embedding is measure preserving up to a constant: for all measurable A  L
with ﬁnite Lebesgue measure kn1(A) we have kn1(p(A)) = cnk
n1(A) with cn a con-
stant depending on n. In particular, we have
pðDnÞ ¼ x 2 ½0; 1n1
X
xi 6 1
n o ¼: Dn1:
The distribution Pr induces a distribution pPr on int Dn1 given by the density
f ðx1; . . . ; xn1Þ :¼ cngðx1; . . . ; xn1; 1
Pn1
i¼1 xiÞ.
The invariance of Pr under t is equivalent to the invariance of pPr under
tp : ðx1; . . . ; xn1Þ 7! 1=ð1þ ðr  1Þx1Þðrx1; x2; . . . ; xn1Þ:
We thus have transformed our original problem on Dn  L into a similar problem for
Dn1  Rn1. To simplify notation, we write in the following again t for the reparam-
eterized transformation tp, and Pr for the induced distribution pPr.
According to the transformation theorem for integrals, the density of the
transformed distribution t(Pr) is given by
f tðxÞ :¼ f ðt1ðxÞÞ= j J tðt1ðxÞÞ j ðx 2 Dn1Þ; ðA:5Þ
where Jt is the Jacobian matrix of t. We have to show that f
t = f.
For this, we ﬁrst evaluate the Jacobian. With a := 1 + (r  1)x1 the partial
derivatives of t are
oti
oxj
¼
r=a2; i ¼ j ¼ 1;
0; i ¼ 1; j 6¼ 1;
ðr  1Þxj=a2; i 6¼ 1; j ¼ 1;
1=a; i ¼ j 6¼ 1;
0; 1 6¼ i 6¼ j 6¼ 1:
8>>>><
>>>>>:
The Jacobian matrix, thus, is in lower triangular form, and its determinant is the
product of the main diagonal elements:
j J tðxÞ j¼ r=an: ðA:6Þ
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t1ðxÞ ¼ r=bðx1=r; x2; . . . ; xn1Þ: ðA:7Þ
Thus
f ðt1ðxÞÞ ¼ cn 1 x1b 
Xn1
i¼2
r
b
xi
 !
rn2
bn1
Yn1
i¼1
xi
" #1
¼ cn r
n1
bn
b
r
 x1
r

Xn1
i¼2
xi
 !Yn1
i¼1
xi
" #1
¼ cn r
n1
bn
1
Xn1
i¼1
xi
 !Yn1
i¼1
xi
" #1
; ðA:8Þ
where the last equality follows from (b  x1)/r = 1  x1.
With (A.6) and (A.7):
j J tðt1ðxÞÞ j¼ rð1þ ðr  1Þx1=bÞn ¼
rbn
ðbþ ðr  1Þx1Þn ¼
bn
rn1
: ðA:9Þ
From (A.5), (A.8) and (A.9) now ft = f follows.
The uniqueness assertion of the theorem follows from general results on the
uniqueness of invariant measures [8, Section 60, Theorem C]. For a straightforward
application of these results it is only necessary to realize that Dn is a locally compact
Hausdorff space, and that the condition Pr(A) <1 for compact A entails that Pr is
regular [3, Proposition 7.2.3]. h
Lemma 4.8 Let A 2A. There exists a unique A 0 2 orb(A) with chm(A 0) = u.
Proof. In the following we denote with hx, yi the scalar product of vectors in Rn.
Assume that no tr 2 Tn with chm(trA) = u exists. Let
 :¼ inf fkchmðtAÞ  uk j t 2 T ng:
The inﬁmum here is attained for some t 2 Tn, i.e. there exists B 2 orb(A) with
kchm(B)  uk =  > 0. Let c := chm(B). We show that there exists tr 2 Tn with
kchm(trB)  uk < .
Consider the function p# hc  u, pion Dn. The subset of Dn with hc  u, pi = d
for a constant d 2 R is the intersection of Dn with a hyperplane that is orthogonal to
c  u. Fig. 4 shows as dashed lines several such hyperplanes for different values of d.
With hu, pi = 1/n for all p 2 Dn one obtains hc  u, ui = 0, and hc  u, ci =
hc, ci  1/n > 0. We show that there exists a set {r(d)jd 2 [1/2, 2]} of parameters of
transformations in Tn such that tr(1) is the identity transformation, and
f ðdÞ :¼ hc u; chmðtrðdÞBÞi
is decreasing in d with f 0(1) < 0. It follows that the parametric curve d# chm(tr(d)B)
is as shown in Fig. 4, i.e. it intersects the -ball around u, which then contradicts the
deﬁnition of B.
1/2
2
u
c
c – u
Fig. 4. Proof of Lemma 4.8.
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I :¼ fi 2 f1; . . . ; ng jci  ui 6 0g; Iþ :¼ fi 2 f1; . . . ; ng jci  ui > 0g;
and
rðdÞi :¼
d; i 2 I;
1=d; i 2 Iþ:

From the deﬁnition of r(d) it is immediate that hc  u, tr(d)pi is decreasing in d for
all p 2 Dn.
We next show that also the derivative of hc  u, tr(d)pi with respect to d is negative
for all p.
Let p 2 Dn be ﬁxed, and deﬁne
a :¼
X
i2I
pi; b :¼
X
i2Iþ
pi; c :¼
X
i2I
ðci  uiÞpi; d :¼
X
i2Iþ
ðci  uiÞpi:
Then
hc u; trðdÞpi ¼ dcþ d=ddaþ b=d ;
and
o
od
hc u; trðdÞpi ¼ 2 dðcb daÞðd2aþ bÞ2 : ðA:10Þ
Since both I and I+ are nonempty, and ci  ui < 0 for at least one i 2 I, one
obtains a > 0, b > 0, c < 0, d > 0. It follows that (A.10) is negative for all d and p.
We now transfer these pointwise results for single p to the function f(d). By the
deﬁnition of the center of mass and the linearity of the scalar product
f ðdÞ ¼
Z
trðdÞB
hc u; pidHðpÞ=HðtrðdÞBÞ:
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H(tr(d)B) is a constant that does not depend on d, and thatZ
trðdÞB
hc u; pidHðpÞ ¼
Z
B
hc u; trðdÞpidHðpÞ: ðA:11Þ
Since ood hc u; trðdÞpi is uniformly continuous as a function of (p, d) on B · [1/2, 2], we
can move the differentiation into the integration, and obtain
o
od
f ðdÞ ¼ m
Z
B
o
od
hc u; trðdÞpidHðpÞ:
The integrand here is strictly negative at d = 1. With H(B) > 0 it follows that
o
od f ðdÞð1Þ < 0. hReferences
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